ABSTRACT Group key agreement is a good way to ensure secure communication within a group. However, the identity authentication, privacy protection, and information sharing access control (different access rights may exist for different sensitivity of information) are key issues to be solved in group key agreement. Aiming at these problems, this paper proposes a group key agreement protocol based on privacy protection and attribute authentication (GKA-PPAA). The protocol proposes identity authentication for hidden attributes; it not only preserves the advantages of traditional identity-based key agreement protocol, but also provides hiding the identity information and privacy protection of the individual, and also proposes information sharing access control, which different secret information is shared among a set of members who have different levels of authority. It increases the flexibility of group key management. In addition, the group key factors are also calculated before the group key agreement, which eliminates most of the computation overhead due to the group key agreement. This protocol is proven secure under the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem assumptions. The performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme is much more efficient than the existing ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent security concerns are prevailing when multiple devices over a wireless communication interact among them leaking sensitive information to a non-participating entity [1] , [2] . Group key agreement is a secure and robust approach to establish group keys for secure group oriented applications over non-private underlying networks. Therefore, the group key agreement protocol is a good way to ensure secure communication within a group. However, people are worried about privacy protection and authentication. Implementing privacy protection ensures that communication messages are not intercepted by eavesdroppers, and authentication ensures that any unauthorized user cannot fraudulently obtain the required services from the primary domain. Authenticated key agreement protocols concern the identity The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zheli Liu. authentication of users, which ensures only the intended group members to establish a group session key to use encryption communication. At the same time, lightweight, small computing and communication overhead and security are important indicators in group key negotiation. With these demands in mind, Group key agreement protocol based on privacy protection and attribute authentication is proposed.
In this paper, for the sensitivity of the communication information and the permissions of terminals are different, information exchange may need different set member in the same group. Therefore, based on the different attributes of members, we propose a key agreement protocol for securely exchanging different secret information between members of different privilege groups. This protocol combines the advantages of attribute encryption and identity authentication. Attribute encryption and authentication techniques are adopted to guarantee the secure of group key agreement, and protect the personal privacy. VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
A. RELATED WORK
The first key agreement protocol based on asymmetric cryptography was proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [3] . Since then, many researches have been done in this area. Dynamic asymmetric group key agreement concerns about the scenarios such as the terminals in mobile cloud networks may join or leave at any given time [4] , [5] . Authenticated key agreement protocols authenticate the identities of users to ensure that only the intended group members can establish a session in which the group members can communicate with each other [6] , [7] . The affiliation-hiding protocol not only exhibits the affiliation-hiding property, but also holds the properties of detectability and perfect forward secrecy [8] - [11] .
On the security of authenticated group key agreement is proposed in [12] - [14] , which contributes to identify the security vulnerabilities in the existing protocols, and present a fix to the ephemeral secret key leakage attack of the protocol presented by Tan and Gupta and Biswas to make it secure. An authenticated asymmetric group key agreement based on attribute encryption is proposed [15] , which combines the advantages of attribute encryption and identity authentication. Attribute encryption and authentication techniques are adopted to guarantee the secure of group key agreement, and protect the personal privacy. Its computation and communication loads moved to powerful server to reduce the workload on terminal. It is suitable to use in centralized network environment. Secure group communication is of great importance for many collaborative and distributed applications in Internet of Things [16] , [17] . A secure and efficient group key agreement scheme for VANET is proposed in [18] , which negotiates a dynamic session secret key using a fixed roadside unit help to provide more stable communication performance and speed up the encryption and decryption process to ensures that vehicles exchange information securely in VANET.
Multi-domain lightweight asymmetric group key agreement is proposed in [19] - [21] , which adopts the bilinear mapping and blind key technology to achieve an asymmetric group key agreement protocol among mobile terminals distributed in different domains and proposes a communication and computation migration technologies to ensure that the mobile terminal lightweight computing and communication consumption and also can achieve anonymity and authentication. An authenticated group key agreement protocol with user anonymity based on Chebyshev chaotic maps is proposed in [22] , it can resist reflection attack and achieve contributory group key agreement with user authentication, and it is suitable for multi-server and mobile environments. A cross-domain lightweight asymmetric group key agreement to establish a safe and efficient group communication channel between sensor nodes is proposed in [23] , [24] . In this protocol, the computation and communication overhead are lightweight.
A dynamic and cross-domain authenticated asymmetric group key agreement is proposed in [25] . This protocol adopts cross-domain authentication mechanism to avoid the security risks of key escrow and the complexity of certificate management. It supports the dynamic group key update of nodes for forward secrecy and backward security of group key, and also achieves the key self-certified, the member participated group key agreement can self-certify whether the calculated group keys are correct. A Certificateless OneWay Group Key Agreement Protocol for End-to-End Email Encryption is proposed in [26] , [27] , which is suitable to implement E2E email encryption. The group key agreement is certificateless, so there are no key escrow problem and no public key certificate infrastructure is required, and it is one-way group key agreement and thus no back-and-forth message exchange is required. At the same time, it is a nparty group key agreement (not just 2-or 3-party).
A group key agreement mechanism based on the Chinese remainder theorem is proposed to distribute the group key for authenticated vehicles in [28] - [31] . The group key can be updated when the vehicle joins and leaves the group. It needs a third-party trusted organization with strong computing and storage capabilities to distribute group key for all vehicles, and it has security risks. A Twofold Group Key Agreement Protocol for NoC based MPSoCs is proposed in [32] , [33] , which proposes a twofold group key agreement protocol which addresses the need of a shared symmetric key among insider members in a group and an asymmetric key pair for any unrestricted sender. The proposed protocol offers a lightweight symmetric encryption for intra zone communication and a public key encryption for inter zone communication taking most advanced security issues into account.
A password-based conditional privacy preserving authentication and group-key generation protocol for VANETs is presented in [34] . This protocol offers group-key generation, user leaving, user joining and password change facilities. It is lightweight in terms of computation and communication since it can be designed without bilinear-pairing and elliptic curve. Concurrently Deniable Group Key Agreement and Its Application to Privacy-Preserving VANETs is proposed in [35] , [36] , which present a novel transformation from an unauthenticated group key agreement to a deniable (authenticated) group key agreement without increasing communication round. It designs an authenticated and privacy-preserving communication protocol for VANETs by using the proposed deniable group key agreement.
A Survey on Group Key Agreement Protocols in Cloud Environment is proposed in [37] - [39] , which are group key agreement protocol, triple-party protocol and double-party protocol, according to the number of users participating in the agreement. Then we give a summary of these proposed key agreement protocols based on the classification. After performing analysis on security and performance of these key agreement protocols respectively, a comment on each category is made.
Certificateless and identity-based authenticated asymmetric group key agreement is proposed in [40] , which formalizes the security model of certificateless authenticated asymmetric group key agreement and realizes a one-round certificateless authenticated asymmetric group key agreement protocol to resist active attacks in the real world. It investigates the relation between certificateless authenticated Asymmetric group key agreement and identity-based authenticated Asymmetric group key agreement, and also proposes a concrete conversion from certificateless authenticated Asymmetric group key agreement to session key escrow-free identity-based authenticated Asymmetric group key agreement.
A secure and efficient group key agreement protocol is proposed in [41] , [42] , it is adaptive for cluster-based communications in mobile ad hoc networks. It describes a novel secure cluster-head selection mechanism in the proposed protocol. The protocol provides security for dynamic group operations in addition to the basic security properties. A secure key agreement protocol for dynamic group is proposed in [43] . In this work, it focuses on the confidentiality aspect of secure group communication. If a member or group of members wants to join a secure communication group, they should initially be authenticated by a separate authentication protocol. A self-authentication and deniable efficient group key agreement protocol is proposed in [44] , [45] . The scheme establishes a group between road side units and vehicles by using self-authentication without certification authority, and improves certification efficiency by using group key transmission method.
Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol without Pairing is proposed in [46] , [47] , which achieved security of the proposed scheme following the most standard and recent security notion namely the EGBG model. It has proved the authenticated key exchange (AKE) security and the mutual authentication (MA) security with full forward secrecy, considering leakage of both the keys long-term and ephemeral, adopting a comparatively efficient technique, the game hopping technique. A Certificateless Group Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol for Secure Communication in Untrusted UAV Networks is proposed in [48] , which propose to tackle the problem of secure communication among untrusting parties with a certificateless-group authenticated key agreement (CL-GAKA) scheme to enable confidentiality, message integrity, and authenticity in drone communications.
An efficient one round certificateless authenticated group key agreement protocol is proposed in [49] , [50] , it satisfies the security demand of mobile Ad Hoc networks. The protocol has achieved appropriate optimization to improve the performance of Ad Hoc networks in terms of frequent communication interruptions and reconnections. In addition, it has reduced executive overheads of key agreement protocol to make the protocol more suitable for mobile Ad Hoc network applications.
A flexible asymmetric group key agreement protocol that information exchange and transmission are orientable is proposed in [51] . The paper adopts bilinear mapping and two-way anonymous authentication technology to hide personal identity authentication information, and uses storage and computing migration technology to reduce the resource consumption of mobile terminal, and also proposes the secret key factor oriented extraction and combinations technology to achieve multi-level three-dimensional complex space security information exchange requirements and meet the lightweight computing. A secure chaotic maps-based group key agreement scheme is proposed in [52], [53] , which provides member anonymity to ensure the privacy of the communication between the social networking platform and the members. This protocol integrates the mechanisms of message encryption and member verification into the scheme to allow the members to anonymously interact with the services of the online social network, thereby enhancing the credibility of the online social network system.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
Through the analysis of the above research status, in the current group key agreement process, exchanged information in the group is shared among all members of this group, this means that all members of the group have the same information sharing permissions, and the hierarchical group information security exchange cannot be implemented. That is, different sensitivity information can only be shared among group members with corresponding rights, and group members who do not have corresponding rights cannot share the information. The current group key negotiation study also does not implement the personal privacy protection function well, in the process of the group key agreement, the group members are easy to expose personal identity information or expose personal attribute information. To solve the above problems, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) An identity authentication technology based on hidden attributes is proposed, which not only hides identity information but also hides attribute information. It not only preserves the advantages of traditional identity-based key agreement protocol, but also provides protection for personal privacy.
2) A threshold-based information exchange technology is proposed, in which only the threshold of the attribute meeting the group key agreement requirement can be used for group key agreement, thereby implementing group information exchange. Different secret information is shared among a set of members who have different levels of authority. When a person has some secret information, he can exchange information with some people who have the appropriate level of security permissions rather than all the members in the group. It increases the flexibility and security of group information exchange.
3) A group key calculation correctness self-validation algorithm is proposed, in which each group key agreement participant can verify whether the calculated group key is correct according to the parameters in the calculation process. All the participants can verify the group keys correctness without any other additional communication.
C. ORGANIZATION
In section II, we describe the proposed group key agreement in this paper; In section III, we analyze and prove the VOLUME 7, 2019 correctness and security of GKAP-PPAA protocol; In section IV, we further analyze the efficiency and performance of the protocol. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. THE PROPOSED GROUP KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL A. BILINEAR MAPS AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
This paper is based on the basic theory of bilinear mapping; some basic knowledge related to bilinear mapping will be described in this section.
Let G 1 be an additive group and G 2 is a multiplicative group. Both of them have the same prime order q, where q ≥ 2 + 1, and is a security parameter. G 1 is generated by g 1 , that means G 1 = g 1 , and the discrete logarithm problems of G 1 and G 2 are difficult. We call e an admissible pairing, if e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 satisfies the follow properties:
(1) bilinearty: For all µ, ν ∈ G 1 , and a, b ∈ Z * q , there is e(aµ, bν) = e(µ, ν) ab ;
(2) Non-degeneracy: There exits µ, ν ∈ G 1 , such that e(µ, ν) = 1; (3) Computability: For all µ, ν ∈ G 1 , there exists a efficient way to calculate e(µ, ν).
Inference1. For all µ, ν, g 1 ∈ G 1 , there is e(µ + ν, g 1 ) = e(µ, g 1 )e(ν, g 1 ).
B. LAGRANGIAN INTERPOLATION THEOREM
Generally, if known y = f (x) has different function values y 0 , y 1 , · · · , y n at the n + 1 different points x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x n , this function passes through these n + 1 points (x 0 , y 0 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), · · · , (x n , y n ), we can consider constructing a polynomial y = P n (x) of degree at most n that passes through the n + 1 points to satisfy:
To estimate any point ε where ε = x i , i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n to use the value of P n (ε) as the approximation of the accurate value of f (ε). This method is called interpolation. The
General Form Application Method. There are n points (x 0 , y 0 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), · · · , (x n−1 , y n−1 ) in the plane. Now a function f (x) is used to make the image pass through these n points. The specific methods are as follows:
Practice. Let a set D n be a set of subscripts about point (x, y), where D n = {0, 1, · · · , n − 1} and then make n polynomials p j (x) where j ∈ D n . For any k ∈ D n , there are p k and
where the formula p k (x) is a polynomial of degree n − 1 and satisfies p k (x m ) = 0 and
The interpolation polynomial L n (x) of the form above is called Lagrange interpolation polynomial.
C. INITIALIZATION
In this section, we describe a group key agreement protocol based on privacy protection. The protocol consists of AA (Attribute Authority) and network terminals. AA is a key entity who generates system public parameters and master keys. The system public parameters contain some group key parameters, which can be used by network terminals to negotiate group session keys. Especially, it performs attribute authentication and permission distribution of network terminals. AA also manages users in other areas and it is fully trusted by entities in the group key agreement protocol.
In this work, it is assumed that the protocol contains an AA and n network terminals. Let U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n } be the set of network terminals. And the corresponding identity set is ID = {id u 1 , id u 2 , . . . , id u n }. AA defines an ordered network attribute set Attr = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A j , . . . , A R }, where A j < A j+1 (j < R) and R ∈ N * denotes the number of the network attribute. And attr i = {a i,1 , a i,2 , . . . , a i,r } is the ordered attribute set of network terminal u i , where attr i ⊆ Attr, r ∈ N * , r ≤ R and a i,r−1 < a i,r . i denotes the ith terminal and r denotes the rth attribute of u i .
Network terminals participated in group key agreement for group security communication must have some common attributes in network.
Assuming G 1 is an additive group, and the G 2 is a multiplicative group. The discrete logarithm over G 1 and G 2 is difficult. Assuming g 1 ∈ G 1 is a generator of G 1 . G 1 and G 2 have the same large prime number order q. Parameter e is a computable bilinear mapping and e :
The KeyGen 1 λ algorithm is run by AA, It takes the security parameters λ as input, and outputs the system master key SK A ∈ Z * q and public key PK A = g 1 SK A .
The AA (Attribute Authority) runs the KeyGen(1 λ ) algorithm to obtain a public/private key pair (SK A , PK A ), where SK A ∈ Z * q and PK A = SK A g 1 . The any member u i ∈ U (1 ≤ i ≤ n) chooses a random positive integer s u i ∈ Z * q and calculates sk u i = H 1 (id u i )s u i as its private key and the public key is pk u i = g 1 sk u i . The system parameters are params
D. GROUP MEMBER REGISTRATION
The group member registration of proposed protocol is depicted in Table 1 , and the detailed steps are performed as follows:
(1) AA represents the attribute set With above steps, all the terminals u i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) register successfully. And AA can obtain the attribute information from all the registration terminals u i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). AA divides the permission levels of group members according to the number of attributes. Then AA can construct an information pool of registration terminals, as shown in Table 2 , which can be used in different hierarchical terminals for group key agreement according to different attributes online phase.
E. GROUP KEY COMPUTING WITH DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTE PERMISSION
Members in the group may have different access authority and the information also has different security levels. Group members with the same authorization want to exchange internal information. The group information exchange sponsor may view the members with some specific attribute permission from information pool of registration terminals on the AA platform, then it can select the corresponding members with some specific attribute permission to form a group for group key agreement, thereby implementing the information exchange of the group. The detailed steps are performed as follows:
Any member u j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) with the attribute set attr j = with a subgroup member who has the same grade of authority or a higher grade of authority. It can select some members from the information pool on the AA platform to construct a subgroup when it wants to share secret information with them. The computational process of subgroup keys is as follows:
(1) The sponsor u j who wants to share secret information with someone that have corresponding access authority. It searches for some attribute privilege values and corresponding privilege grade information from the information pool in Table 1 . According to this information, it ensures which members can share secret information with it. For convenience, assuming it selects the members set is U =
(2) u j gets the information T k,1 , . . . , T k,r of each u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) from the information pool in Table 1 and computes ,2 ) , . . . , w j,r = H 2 (K j,r ) and constructs a (r−1)-th degree polynomial f (x) = m j K j,r−1 x r−1 + ... + m j K j,1 x + M j according to the attribute permission values {K j,1 , K j,2 , ..., K j,r } that it kept before and f (0) = M j , then it computes f (w j,1 ) = y j,1 , f (w j,2 ) == y j,1 , f (w j,2 ) = y j,2 , . . . , f (w j,r ) = y j,r and ϕ j = sk u j (y j,1 + y j,2 + ... + y j,r ). u j uses PK g−u j = (p u j , η j,h ) as group encryption key and SK g−u j = M j as group decryption key, where η j,h can be found in Table 2 . u j broadcasts the messages {(y j,1 , y j,2 , ..., y j,r ), (p u j , η j,h ), ϕ j } to all members U = {u j , u j+1 , ...u l }(j < l) in the group.
(4) Each member u k (j ≤ k ≤ l, k = j) in the group who received the message {(y j,1 , y j,2 , . . . , y j,r ), (p u j , η j,h ), ϕ j } from u j , it computes φ k = y j,1 + y j,2 + . . . + y j,r and verifies the identity of u j by equation e(ϕ j , g 1 ) = e(φ k , pk u j ). If it holds, u k compares its privilege value η k,h with the privilege value η j,h . If it has the same grade of authority or higher grade of authority than η j,h , it can find the correspond attribute permission values (w k,1 , y j,1 ), (w k,2 , y j,2 ) , . . . , (w k,r , y j,r )} and Lagrange theorem and computes the constant term
y j,χ = M j as its group decryption key. u k can also obtain the group encryption key
All the members u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) in the group can compute the same group decryption key M k and the group encryption key (p u k , η k,h ) if they have the same grade of authority or higher grade of authority than η j,h of the group key agreement sponsor.
F. GROUP KEYS CORRECTNESS SELF-CERTIFIED
All the group members u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) calculated group keys, they needn't broadcast the hash values of the group keys to other group members and compare with hash values of the group the other members broadcast to verify whether the correctness of the group keys it computed. They can verify whether the equation e(p u k , η k,h ) = e(M k , PK A ) holds to check whether the correctness of the computed group keys.
G. GROUP SECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Instance: For any plaintext message m ∈ M * (M * : plaintext space), each u j with the group encryption key PK g−u j = (p u j , η j,h ) and group decryption key M j operates as the follows:
Encryption: u j chooses a random number ς ∈ Z * p , and calculates
Decryption: After receiving a ciphertext c = (υ, V ), anyone u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) in the same group can calculate m = V ⊕ H 3 (e(υ, M k )) with a valid M k .
III. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, some performances of the proposed GKAP-PPAA protocol are discussed. Firstly, the correctness of our proposed protocol is shown. Secondly, the security analysis of GKAP-PPAA protocol is given. Finally, the efficiency analysis of GKAP-PPAA protocol is testified. In order to validate performances claim of proposed protocol, the following theorems are proven.
Theorem 1 (Contributiveness) :
By running the proposed GKAP-PPAA protocol, contributory group keys can be established by all participators of GKAP-PPAA protocol . Each participator may confirm that its contribution was included in the group encryption key and group decryption key.
Proof: Since each participator u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) in the group computed the group encryption key is PK g−u k = (p u k , η k,h ) and the parameter
which means each parameter λ k of u k is included in the group encryption key PK g−u k . So the contribution of each participator u k is included in the group encryption key.
In the same way, the group decryption key is SK g−u k = m j T pri and the parameter is
Therefore, the contribution of each participator u k also was included in the group decryption key M k . For above, the contribution of each participator u k in GKAP-PPAA was included in the group encryption key and group decryption key.
A. CORRECTNESS
The proof of the correctness of the GKAP-PPAA is shown in the following theorems.
Theorem 2: If they have the same grade of authority or higher grade of authority than sponsor u j demanded, each u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) can calculate an identical group decryption key SK g−u k and group encryption key PK g−u k in this protocol.
Proof: We assume that the attribute set of u j is set attr j = {a j,1 , a j,2 , . . . , a j,r } and the correspond attribute permission value set of u j is V u j = {K j,1 , K j,2 , ..., K j,r }. The attribute set of u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) in the group is attr k = {a k,1 , a k,2 , ..., a k,ω } and the correspond attribute permission value set of
in the group has the same grade of authority or higher grade of authority than sponsor u j , it means u k has the same number of attribute permission values or more attribute permission values than u j , that is ,2 ) , . . . , w j,r = H 2 (K j,r ) and constructs a r-th degree polynomial Similarly, all the participator u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) in the group can receive an identical group encryption key (p u j , η j,h ) from u j .
Theorem 3: any group members u k (j ≤ k ≤ l) can decrypt the ciphertext information that encrypted by member u τ (1 ≤ τ ≤ n) using the group encryption key (p u k , η k,h ) with its group decryption key SK g−u k .
Proof:
For the above calculation, and the properties of the bilinear pairings, any ciphertext information V = m ⊕ H 3 ((e(p u k , η k,h ) ς ) encrypted by member u τ using the group encryption key (p u k , η k,h ), where ς ∈ Z * p , υ = ς PK A . The corresponding plaintext information m can be obtained by m = V ⊕ H 3 (e(υ, SK g−u k )) using its group decryption key SK g−u k .
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Theorem 4:
The proposed GKAP-PPAA protocol is secure against passive adversary: A group key agreement protocol is secure against a passive adversary if a passive attacker is unable to obtain information about the established session key by eavesdropping on messages transmitted over the broadcast channel. To prove that is so, we need a well-known security assumption. Here we adopt the DLP problem and DBDH problem assumption to prove that the new protocol is secure against a passive adversary. Several works have already demonstrated the security and the variants of the decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
Assumption 1 (DLP Problem and DBDH Problem): Let G 1 be an additive group and G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group, Both of the two groups have the same large prime order q, where q ≥ 2 + 1, and is a security parameter, the discrete logarithm over G 1 and G 2 is difficult, G 1 = g 1 is generated by g 1 , G 1 and G 2 are a pair of bilinear group, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a calculable bilinear mapping.
Discrete Logarithm problem (DLP). For given ψ = ag 1 , ζ = bg 1 , and σ = abg 1 , where b, a ∈ Z * q and ψ, ζ , σ ∈ G 1 , a < q. If a and ζ are given, it is easy to calculate σ . But if ζ and σ are given, it will be difficult to calculate a.
Decisional Bilinear Diffe-Hellman (DBDH) Problem: Suppose the following two triples (g 1 , g 2 , ag 1 , bg 1 , cg 1 ,  e(g 1 , g 1 ) abc ) and (g 1 , g 2 , ag 1 , bg 1 , cg 1 , π) , for any a, b, c ∈ Z * q , g 1 ∈ G 1 , g 2 ∈ G 2 and π ∈ G 2 , are computationally indistinguishable. In other words, there is no efficient algorithm A VOLUME 7, 2019 that satisfies
.
for any polynomial Q, where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c and π . Lemma 1: Under the random oracle model, if computing the DLP is hard, any malicious adversary C without the same grade of authority or higher grade of authority than the group key agreement sponsor demanded will be unable to obtain the group decryption key SK g−u j .
Proof: C only has two ways to solve the group decryption key SK g−u j .
The first method is to solve the polynomial: if C without the same grade of authority or higher grade of authority than that of group key agreement sponsor u j demanded, that means C does not have enough attributes and the corresponding attribute permission values {K j,1 , K j,2 , . . . , K j,r }. Although C can get the messages {(y j,1 , y j,2 , ..., y j,r ), (p u j , η j,h ), ϕ j } broadcast by u j over the open network, it does not have the corresponding attribute permission values {K j,1 , K j,2 , ..., K j,r } and cannot calculate the corresponding polynomial parameters
and it can't construct the construct the corresponding pairs { (w j,1 , y j,1 ), (w j,2 , y j,2 ) , . . . , (w j,r , y j,r )}. According to Lagrange interpolation formula, C cannot recover polyno- 
if C wants to calculate the group decryption key SK g−u j , it must compute (t j,1 + t j,2 + ... + t j,r ) from η j,h and compute
We assume that C can compute the value (t j,1 + t j,2 + ... + t j,r ) from η j,h by an efficient algorithm A. Then, C can construct an efficient algorithm A to uses σ = abg 1 = η j,h and ζ = bg 1 = SK A g 1 as input, and output a = (t j,1 + t j,2 + ... + t j,r ). So it can use A to construct an efficient algorithm A to solve the DLP problem, which is a contradiction for the hard of DLP problem. 
. . . g 2 , ag 1 , bg 1 , cg 1 , π) , where υ = ς PK A = ag 1 , η j,h = (t j,1 + t j,2 + . . . + t j,r )PK A = bg 1 ,
, which is a contradiction for the DBDH problem assumption. Thus, the proposed protocol is secure against passive attacks under the DBDH problem assumption.
Theorem 5: Under the random oracle model, the proposed protocol is secure against an impersonator's attack. Any illegal member u i cannot pretend to be a key agreement sponsor u j to initiate an invalid group key agreement.
Proof: we know that only one legal participant u j with secret key sk u j can generate a valid signature ϕ j = sk u j (y j,1 + y j,2 + . . . + y j,r ). Since impersonator u i does not know u j 's secret key sk u j , it cannot counterfeit the valid signature ϕ j . If the impersonator u i attempts to disrupt the establishment of a group key among honest participants, he will be detected by verifying the equation e(ϕ j , g 1 ) = e(φ i , pk u j ). Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against impersonator attack.
IV. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
During the process of designing protocol, except security, the computational time, the computational complexity and communication costs are important performance measures of the group key agreement. In this paper, we compared and analyzed the literature that can be quantified in recent years. We compare the proposed protocol with the related works [26] , [37] , [54] in communication costs, computation costs and time cost. Below are the few notations and data that are going to be used in comparison [34] .
• T inv : Execution time for calculating the modular inverse operation, T inv ≈ 0.174ms.
• T mul : Execution time for the multiplication of two numbers, T mul ≈ 0.015ms.
• T exp : Execution time for Exponentiation, T exp ≈ 3.886ms.
• T pa−ecc : Execution time for calculating the elliptic curve point addition, T pa−ecc ≈ 0.0018ms.
• T sm−ecc : Execution time for calculating the elliptic curve point multiplication, T sm−ecc ≈ 0.442ms.
• T h : Execution time for the general hash operation, T h ≈ 0.0001ms.
• T bp : Execution time for the bilinear pairing operation, T bp ≈ 4.211ms.
• T mtp : Execution time of the map-to-point hash operation, T mtp ≈ 4.406ms.
• T pa−bp : Execution time of the point addition related to bilinear pairing, T pa−bp ≈ 0.071ms.
• T sm−bp : Execution time of the multiplication of scalar with the point based on bilinear pairing, T sm−bp ≈ 1.709ms. Table 3 lists the comparison and analysis between the GKAP-PPAA protocol and other three group-key agreement protocols in the calculation of complexity, communication load and time cost of group key agreement initiator. We assume that there are n members to participate group key agreement and the group key agreement initiator requires members with at least r attributes to participate in the group key negotiation in the GKAP-PPAA, where r is very small relative to n.
In reference [26] scheme, the Parameter calculation phase, there needs (n + 2)T mul + nT h , the computing of group encryption key phase, there needs (n − 1)T bp + nT sm−bp + nT pa−bp , the computing of group decryption key phase, there needs nT pa−ecc , the total computation cost is (n − 1)T bp +(n + 2)T mul +nT sm−bp +nT pa−bp +nT pa−ecc +nT h . Communication cost: message of sent is (n + 3) |G|, message of received is (n + 3) |G|.
In reference [46] scheme, the Parameter calculation phase there needs nT exp +nT mul . The computing of group encryption key phase there needs 3nT bp +2nT sm−bp +nT sm−ecc . The computing of group decryption key phase, there needs nT sm−ecc , the total computation cost is 3nT bp +nT exp + 2nT sm−bp + 2nT sm−ecc + nT mul . Communication cost: message of sent is (n + 3) |G|, message of received is (n + 3) |G|. From Table 3 , GKAP-PPAA has the lowest computational complexity, Lv et al.'s protocol [37] For convenience and without loss of generality, we do time cost analysis involves the ordinary node of group key agreement. Based on the data provided by Table 3 , we analyzed the time consumption of sponsor as the size of the group key agreement changes when r = 2, r = 6, r = 10 respectively and compared the GKAP-PPAA with other three protocols in time cost of ordinary node when r = 10. The results are show as Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 respectively.
From Fig.1 , when the size of the group key agreement member changes in the GKAP-PPAA, the calculation time of the group key initiator changes little.
From figure 2, for the ordinary nodes, GKAP-PPAA has the lowest time cost of ordinary nodes when the number of group key agreement members is less than 20, followed by Lv et al.'s protocol [37] and Zhang et al.'s protocol [26] . Wei et al.'protocol [46] has the highest time cost.
When these protocols are used in a wireless network environment, the communication consumption of the protocol should be taken into account. In this section, we perform the total energy consumption cost analysis of performing GKA using the data provided in Wei et al. [46] . As for the communication energy cost, an IEEE 802.11 Spectrum24 WLAN card consumes 0.00066 mJ for the transmission of 1 bit and 0.00031 mJ for the reception of 1 bit. The abovementioned energy costs will be used for the communication energy analysis of the four GKA protocols. To compute the communication cost, we need to know the size of the information exchange. We assume that the secure key length is 160b of the elliptic curve cryptography. All these four protocols adopt the elliptic curve cryptography, so their key length is 160b. Let the length of the information exchange be 160b, and the communication consumption is shown in Fig. 3 .
The communication consumption of the examined Protocols are depicted in Fig.3 . Lv et al.'s protocol [37] has the worst performance, followed by Zhang et al.'s protocol [26] and Lv et al.'s protocol [37] . GKAP-PPAA is very efficient in terms of communication When the number of group key agreement members exceeds 20.
V. CONCLUSION
Group key agreement is one of the key technologies to ensure the secure exchange of information among groups. This paper proposes an asymmetric group key agreement protocol based on attribute authentication and personal privacy protection. The protocol adopts attribute-based identity authentication technology. In the process of attribute authentication, the attribute is hidden by polynomial calculation to achieve the purpose of attribute-based hidden identity authentication, which ensures that personally identifiable information is not leaked, and that personal attribute information is protected from disclosure. The protocol also uses threshold function technology to implement hierarchical group information security exchange, that is, group information with different sensitivities can only be shared among group members with corresponding rights. The protocol ensures that the computing and communication as simple and small as possible. The security of this protocol is based on the hardness of BDLP and DBDH problems. The GKAP-PPAA is also analyzed to be secure, efficient, which is suitable in multilevel and stereoscopic space security information exchange in complex network environment.
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